Reforming the retirement scheme: flexible retirement vs legal retirement age by Lacomba Arias, Juan Antonio & Lagos García, Francisco Miguel
Reforming the retirement scheme: Flexible







We compare a Social Security system where people can retire at the
age of their own choice with one in which there is a legal retirement age
elected through a majority voting process. We analyze how incentives
on retirement decisions change depending on the retirement rules. We
show that individuals prefer a legal retirement age higher than that
they would choose in the flexible scheme since in this scheme they
ignore the impact of their decisions on the Social Security budget
constraint. In spite of that, we show that when the legal retirement
age significantly limits the retirement age of high-wage workers, a
flexible scheme would improve the financing of the pension system.
Finally, we show that even when pension benefits are higher with a
legal retirement age, a flexible system might be implemented since it
would be preferred by a majority of the population composed by low-
and high-wage workers.
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1. Introduction
Reforms of Social Security systems are now one of the main issues of most
of industrialized countries’ economic policy agenda. It is widely considered
that, unless serious changes take place, the rise in the number of retirees
relative to that of workers will threat the viability of pay-as-you-go public
pension systems in the long-run. With the aim of eliminating these future
financing problems, one of the main goals of pension reforms is to raise the
average age of retirement of workers, see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) or
Gruber and Wise (1999).
In order to achieve this objective, one of the main economic policy mea-
sures is to allow a greater flexibility in the Social Security’s retirement rules
(e.g. Germany, Italy or Sweden). Indeed, this measure is one of the policy
conclusions of Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society, OECD (1998,
p.8): ”...the most appropriate reform would be allow people to retire at the
age of their own choice and to adjust the pension level so that the pension
system is neutral on average ”.
There is recent literature dealing with flexible retirement age and Social
Security. Casamatta et al. (2005) study the distortion imposed on contin-
ued activity of elderly workers in a setting with flexible retirement. They
allow individuals to vote on the level of the payroll tax and provide suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium. Conde Ruiz and
Galasso (2003) analyze a simultaneous voting process on the contribution
rate and on the decision to introduce or not an early retirement provision
with endogenous retirement age. Simonovits (2004) and (2005) analyzes the
optimal design of the pension system with flexible retirement focussing on
the importance of the asymmetric information.1
The present article explicitly examines the effectiveness of increasing the
flexibility of the pension system.2 Should the pensionable age be eliminated
and be allowed a larger flexibility in the retirement decisions? Similar to
Casamatta et al. (2005), we consider a two-period OLG model where in the
first period each individual works one unit of time and in the second period
he works for some time and then retires. Individuals differ according to age
and according to productivity. We study two different PAYG Social Security
1Earlier literature has mainly focussed on the effect of the introduction of a pension
system on the individual retirement decision (see among others Sheshinski, 1978; Burbidge
and Robb, 1980 or Crawford and Lilien, 1981).
2Michel and Pestieau (1999) in a model where allow for endogenous retirement show
that a mandatory early retirement may be socially desirable in case of underaccumulation.
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programs with flat pension benefits. In the first setting people can retire at
the age of their own choice. In the second one, there is a legal retirement age
elected through a majority voting process.3
We analyze how incentives on retirement decisions change depending on
the retirement rules. We also compare both the financing of the pension
system and the welfare of the population associated with each retirement
rule. The preferences with regard to the two opposite systems, flexibility vs.
legal retirement age, will depend on the effect on welfare. We interpret these
preferences as a voting decision on the retirement rules.
We show that individuals prefer a legal retirement age higher than that
they would choose in the flexible scheme. This result highlights the differ-
ent incentives on prolonging the working period related to each retirement
scheme. In a flexible system individuals ignore the impact of their decisions
on the Social Security budget constraint, as they only optimize their own
retirement ages. But in a system with a legal retirement age that affects to
all population these indirect effects are taken into account and lead to higher
preferred legal retirement ages.
In spite of the aforementioned, when there exists a sufficient dispersion
in retirement ages, that is, when the legal retirement age significantly limits
the retirement age of high-wage workers, a shift from a pension system with
legal retirement age into a flexible scheme might enhance the financing of
the pension system. This retirement dispersion mainly depends on the wage
distribution and on the elasticity of the labor force.
Finally, we show that even if pension benefits were higher with a legal
retirement age, a majority of the population, formed by low- and high-wage
workers, might prefer the flexible system. Only the middle class would be
in favor of a legal retirement age as an instrument to increase their pension
benefits by forcing lowest wages workers to work longer.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In Section
3 optimal retirement decisions are obtained. In Section 4 we compare the
financing of the pension system and welfare levels under each retirement
scheme. In Section 5 a numerical example illustrates the results obtained in
the previous sections. Section 6 summarizes the main results. The proofs
appear in the appendix.
3To date, there are few studies that have examined the role of the legal retirement age
in the pension system. Lacomba and Lagos (2006) and (2007) study the problem of a
direct vote on the legal retirement age and the effect of the aging of the population on the
optimal legal retirement age.
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2. The model
This model is similar to Casamatta et al. (2005). Individuals live for two
periods. They are located between a minimum and a maximum wage level
per unit of time (productivity), [w−, w
+] with mean w̄ and median wm < w̄.
The intertemporal utility function is as follows:
U (c, d) = u(c) + βu (d) . (1)
The utility function u(.) is as usual, increasing and concave: u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) <
0; c and d are respectively first and second period consumptions; β is the time
preference factor which is equal to 1/1 + r, being r the interest rate.
Both periods are of equal length, normalized to unity. Labor supply is
assumed to be inelastic in the first period. In the second period, we have
to distinguish between the two settings. In the first case, individuals choose
their own retirement age by deciding the fraction of the second period they
continue working, R ∈ [0, 1] ; so R can be interpreted as an indicator of the
individual retirement age. In the second case, individuals have to work the
fraction of the second period chosen through a majority voting process; this
fraction can be interpreted as the indicator of the legal retirement age of the
system.
It has to be noted that the second period consumption d includes the
normal consumption minus the monetary disutility of working in this second
period. We assume a particular specification for this disutility, d = x −
γR(δ+1)/(δ+1) where x is the normal consumption in the second period and
γ > 0 and δ  1 can be interpreted as intensity factors of the disutility of
work.4 So, first and second period consumptions for an individual of wage w
are:
c = w(1− τ)− s (2)
x = s(1 + r) +Rw(1− τ) + (1−R)p, (3)
where s  0 is the amount of savings and τ ∈ [0, 1] is the Social Security
contribution tax rate; p is the constant stream of flat pension benefits per
4The quadratic specification used by Casamatta et al. (2005) is a particular case of the
specification used here, where δ = 1. It has also to be noted that with this utility function
income effects are disregarded: changes in the optimal retirement decision will only be
caused by variations in the relative price of labor and consumption.
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instant of time, collected from a Pay-As-You-Go Social Security system. We
assume that the contribution rate is given. In this way, we want to focus
attention only on how the different retirement rules affect the financing of
the system and welfare levels of individuals. The optimal design of the Social
Security parameters has already been analyzed in recent literature.5 Our
study can be considered as complementary to them, concentrating in another
specific issue of the pension systems reform problem.
3. Retirement decisions
3.1 Flexibility in retirement decision
Under this pension scheme, individuals in the second period are allowed
to retire at the age of their own choice and pension benefits are paid out
after leaving the labor force. Let RF be the individual retirement age. The















where No and Ny = (1 + n)No are respectively the numbers of old and
young individuals and n is the population growth rate. From (4) we obtain
















The old individuals’ problem can be formally represented as
max
RF




5See among others Breyer (1994), Casamatta et al. (2000a), (2000b) and (2005) or
Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003).
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subject to
0  RF  1.







It is worth to note that (8) is obtained assuming that the individual
considers her pension benefits as given, thereby disregarding the effect of her
retirement decisions on the pension benefits via the ‘macro’ constraint, (4).6
As Sheshinski (1978) states, this is a plausible assumption under competitive
conditions with many individuals.
Due to the positive substitution effect and the absence of income effect,
the retirement decision is positively related to the wage level. On the other
hand, a larger contribution rate reduces the net wage and consequently leads
individuals to retire earlier. Finally, a higher intensity factor of the disutility
of work δ, not only reduces optimal retirement ages but also it diminishes
the elasticity of the labor force.
3.1.2 The young











0  RF  1 and 0  sF  w(1− τ).
It is easy to check that the young individual will choose her retirement
age according to (8).7
On the other hand, we can substitute (8) into (6) and denoting
6That is, we assume ∂pF/∂RF = 0.
7From (9), and for individuals choosing an interior solution, we also get the optimal
savings:
syF =










we can rewrite (6) as:
pF =
(




3.2 Legal retirement age
In some countries there are direct restrictions on work beyond the stan-
dard retirement age (in Portugal and Spain entitlement to pension benefits
beyond the standard age is conditional on complete withdrawal from work),
or, frequently, individuals have to leave their current jobs to receive their
pensions (see Blondal and Scarpetta 1998,or Gruber and Wise 1999). So, we
can observe that the average retirement age in some OECD countries, such
as the United Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland is very close to this standard
retirement age.8 Thus, in this setting we consider legal retirement as the age
at which workers are obliged to leave the labor force, that is, as a mandatory
retirement.
In the following, we first derive the optimal legal retirement age of indi-
viduals. Then, we shall turn our attention to the majority voting process
and obtain the elected legal retirement age.
Let RL be the legal retirement age. A feasible Social Security system’s


















+ τ ((1 + n)w̄ + (1− α)pF ) .
See Cassamatta et al. (2005) for a more exhaustive analysis of the optimal decisions in
this setting.
8If there is a possibility of early access to pension benefits with some adjustment to
the value of retirement benefits, the average retirement age is usually found between this
age at which pensions can be accessed and the standard retirement age. See Blondal and
Scarpetta (1998) or Samwick (1998).
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pL = RLw̄. (14)
3.2.1 The old
The old individuals’ problem can be formally represented as
max
RL





0  RL  1.
From (15) we obtain the optimal legal retirement age
R∗L =
(




Under this scheme the positive relationship between the wage and the
preferred legal retirement age can again be explained by the substitution
effect which calls for a higher retirement age. A higher intensity factor of the
disutility of work also reduces optimal legal retirement ages.
However, unlike the flexible system, a higher τ delays the optimal legal
retirement age for those individuals with wages lower than the mean wage.
In order to explain this result, let us recall the double effect associated with
changing the legal retirement age. These changes affect the working popula-
tion’s lifetime income in two ways: fixing the length of the working period
and, in an indirect way, determining the pension benefits via the dependency
ratio. For instance, a delay in the legal retirement age not only increases the
working period but also increases the pension benefits by increasing the de-
pendency ratio. Thus, the larger the pension benefits, the bigger the indirect
effect on the lifetime income of a change in the legal retirement age. The
reason is the larger relative weight of the pension benefits on the individuals’
8
lifetime income. Therefore, the increase in net pension benefits of low wage
workers caused by a greater contribution rate augments the importance of
these indirect effects increasing the relative price of leisure so that individuals
relocate their demand from leisure to consumption and delay their retirement
age.
3.2.2 The young











0  RL  1 and 0  sL  w(1− τ ).
It is easy to check that the young individual will choose her optimal legal
retirement age according to (16).9
3.2.3 The voting process on the legal retirement age
Optimal legal retirement ages are increasing with the wage and thus a
Condorcet winner exists. The majority voting process leads to a legal re-
tirement age, ReL, that divides the population into two groups of equal size:
those who prefer a retirement age above the elected age and those who prefer
a retirement age below the elected one
ReL =
(




Since w̄ > wm, we obtain that a larger contribution rate will lead to a
higher elected legal retirement age and therefore to a longer working period.







δ(w(1− τ(1− α)) + τ(1− α))(δ+1)/δ
(δ + 1)γ1/δ
+ τ(1 + n).
See Lacomba and Lagos (2007) for a more exhaustive analysis of the optimal decisions
in a setting with legal retirement age.
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This result contrasts with the one obtained in the flexible system, where a
larger contribution rate yields lower retirement ages.
Comparing the retirement decisions obtained under the two retirement
schemes, the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 1 i) R∗L > R
∗
F for any w ∈ [w−, w
+] .
ii) ReL > R
∗
F for any w ∈ (w−, wµ) with wµ > wm.
Proof: i) It follows straightforward from (8) and (16).
ii) (18) and (8)can be respectively rewritten as
ReL =
(











Needless to say ReL > R
∗
F for any w ∈ [w−, wm] . From (19) and (20) it can
be derived that there exists a wage wµ > wm, such that R
∗





The first point of the proposition states that any individual would have
her preferred legal retirement age higher than that under a flexible system.
Moreover, the second point shows that more than 50% of the population
would retire earlier than the legal retirement age, keeping everything else
unchanged, if the pension system shifted from a legal retirement age to a
flexible scheme.11 Notice that not only the low wage workers but also the
middle class, with wages higher than the median wage, would retire earlier.
This result crucially relies on the different incentives on retirement deci-
sions embedded in each pension scheme. As mentioned above, in a majority
voting process on the legal retirement age, the effects on the aggregate con-
straint of the adjustment made in the ratio of workers and retirees when the
legal retirement age is lowered/delayed must be taken into account. And they
10Notice that if wµ were higher than w
+, then ReL would be higher than R
∗
F for any
w ∈ [w−, w
+] .
11It would be possible to find individuals who would prefer a higher legal retirement age
than the current one, but they would retire even earlier than that if the pension system
shiftted from a legal retirement age into a flexible scheme.
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play such an important role that lead people to prefer higher legal retirement
ages.
On the contrary, in a flexible scheme the individual ignores the impact
of her decision on the aggregate constraint (and therefore on her pension
benefits) and considers that her retirement decision only affects the length of
her working period. This ignorance yields individual retirement ages lower
than the legal one.
4. Financing of the Pension System and Welfare Levels
In this section we study the financing of the pension system and welfare
levels associated with each retirement scheme. In order to do so, we define
SF and SLas the amount of money collected with flexible retirement and with















































The following proposition highlights the main results derived from (23)
and (24).
Proposition 2 i) SL is increasing with τ .
ii) SF is increasing with ξ(w).
Proof: i) It follows straightforward from (24). ii) It follows straightfor-
ward from (23).
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Raising contribution rates and delaying the retirement age are among
the main reforms for eliminating the future financial problem of pension
systems. The first point of the proposition tells us that in a system with legal
retirement age these two measures may complement each other to achieve an
increase in the amount of money collected (an increase in the contribution
rate would facilitate the delay of the legal retirement age). On the contrary,
in a flexible system, it seems more difficult to implement these two measures
together. As it can be observed in (23), an increase in the contribution rate
has a negative indirect effect on SF (apart from the obvious positive direct
effect). A higher τ would reduce the incentives to prolong the working period
worsening the financing of the system.
On the other hand, the second point states that both the wage distri-
bution and the elasticity of the labor force are crucial in the financing of
a flexible retirement system. The higher the wage dispersion or the more
elastic the labor supply, the more likely the financing of the system will be
enhanced by shifting into a flexible scheme.
We now turn to compare the role the retirement scheme plays in determin-
ing the welfare of the population. Notice that the preferences of population
with regard to retirement rules will depend on how their welfare levels are
affected by the different retirement rules. Thus, these preferences can be
interpreted as a voting decision on changing the retirement scheme. In this
manner, we can also examine whether a flexible retirement system would be
implemented or not. The results are characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 i) If SF  SL, the whole population will prefer a pension
system with flexible retirement.
ii) Even if SF < SL, a majority of the population formed by a coalition
of low- and high-wage workers may prefer a pension system with flexible
retirement.
Proof: i) See Appendix. ii) See numerical example below.
The first point of proposition is obvious. The effect of retirement rules on
welfare comes from two different aspects. On one hand, the effect on pension
benefits and on the other hand the effect on retirement decisions. Needless to
say, if a shift from a legal retirement age scheme into a flexible one enhances
the financing of the system, all individuals will have, firstly, larger pension
benefits and, secondly, they will be able of retiring at the age of their own
choice, which unambiguously will improve their welfare levels.
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A pension system with legal retirement age yields higher welfare levels
only if the related pension benefits are sufficiently great to compensate the
forced retirement. If they are not greater enough, as the second point of
proposition states, the disutility derived from the forced retirement could
lead a majority formed by a coalition made up of the low- and the high-wage
workers to prefer the flexible scheme even with lower pension benefits. The
low-wage group in order to be able to retire earlier without penalties and the
rich group in order to retire later.12 In this case, the legal retirement age
would only be supported by the middle class. Their optimal retirement ages
are similar to the legal one, and therefore the forced retirement would not
be very harmful, so a flexible system would only bring about lower pension
benefits for them.
This result gives an intuition of why the social security in most of countries
has been related to a standard age of entitlement to public pensions instead
of allowing total flexibility in the retirement decision. The legal retirement
age might have been used by a vast middle class as a tool for improving
their pension benefits. The underlying idea is the following. By fixing a
determined age at which workers are eligible for benefits, low-wage workers
were forced to work longer. In this way, these workers had more income
which implies less redistribution from the richest workers to them, resulting
in larger pension benefits for the middle class.
5. Numerical illustrations
In this numerical example we illustrate the effect of the two different re-
tirement schemes on the financing of the pension system and on the individu-
als’ welfare levels. In order to do so we denote the intertemporal utility func-
tion of individuals (1) in the following way. Let V (R∗F , w) and V (R
e
L, w) be
the indirect utility functions under flexible retirement and under legal retire-
ment age respectively. It is easy to check that V (R∗F (w), w) > (<)V (R
e
L, w)
if ν (R∗F (w), w) > (<)ν (R
e
L, w), with









+ τpF . (25)
and
12This result, a coalition made up of the tails of the income distribution, can also be
viewed in Epple and Romano (1996).
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Thus, to obtain the results we use the following specifications. We con-
sider two different distributions. In both of them, wages are distributed
on [w−, w
+] with w− = 300 and w
+ = 16000. They have the same mean
wage, w̄ = 3067.79, but different median ones: wm = 2469.14 in the first
distribution and wm = 2674.22 in the second one.
13 The first column of the
table below describes the contribution rates used. We consider three possi-
bilities: τ = 0.25, τ = 0.30 and τ = 0.35.14 The second, third and fourth
columns of the table are related to the first wage distribution. The second
and third columns contain the wages of the individuals indifferent between
both schemes (indifferent individuals with low wage and with high wage re-
spectively). These individuals have the same welfare level under the two
retirement schemes. The fourth column denotes the percentage of individ-
uals that increases her welfare level with the system with legal retirement
age. They are located between the two previous wages. The fifth, sixth and
seventh column contain the same information than the three previous ones
but related to the second wage distribution.
To complete the picture, we consider two different elasticities of the labor
force. The three first rows of Table 1 show the result related to a labor force
where, for τ = 0.25, the range of optimal retirement ages under the flexible
scheme is R∗F (w) ∈ [0.26; 0.72], and the legal retirement ages for each wage
distribution are ReL = 0.5 and R
e
L = 0.51 respectively. The last three rows
contain the results for a more inelastic labor force. In that case the range of
optimal retirement ages under flexibility is less disperse, R∗F (w) ∈ [0.45; 0.53]
for τ = 0.25, and now the legal retirement age for both wage distributions is
ReL = 0.5.
15, 16
13Data from the first distribution have been obtained from an income distribution of
Spain (as an approximation of the wage distribution) estimated with the Dagum tripara-
metric model. Annual data in thousands of pesetas. Year 1996. The second one is a
different Dagum distribution skewed to the right.
14Contribution rates of most of pension systems are around 30% of the gross wage of
workers.
15The different labor force elasticities are generated considering δ = 4 for the first case
and δ = 24 for the more inelastic labor force. On the other hand, each δ is related to a
different γ in order to get the same ReL for τ = 0.25.
16ξ(w, δ) has the following values for each distribution: ξ(w, 4) = 24201.77 for the first
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Table 1. Numerical examples: indifferent wages and percentages in between
wm= 2469.14 wm= 2674.22
wlo whi % wlo whi %
Elastic Lab. f.
τ = 0.25 − − − 2985.8 4443.9 26.4
τ = 0.30 − − − 2807.8 5265.5 37.8
τ = 0.35 3232.1 5060.9 19.5 2642.6 6194.0 47.5
Inelastic Lab. f.
τ = 0.25 − − − 2891.0 4563.2 30.6
τ = 0.30 3374.8 4207.6 10.7 2733.6 5386.1 41.3
τ = 0.35 2995.0 5355.6 25.8 2578.0 6337.9 50.8
We start with the analysis of the three first rows. The results illustrate the
main intuitions suggested in the previous sections. For the first distribution,
we obtain that a flexible retirement pension system would always be preferred
by the majority of the population. However, for τ = 0.35 the flexible system
would be financially undesirable. This can be deduced by the existence of a
middle class preferring the system with legal retirement age. As the theory
states, this only happens when the pension benefits associated with the legal
retirement age are larger enough than those of the flexible system. Also notice
that this middle class would be composed by workers with wages higher than
the median one, wm = 2469.14.
The importance of the wage distribution is highlighted when we compare
the results obtained with those of the second distribution. In this case the
main objective of the reform, to improve the financing of the system, is
never achieved. Pension benefits is always larger with the legal retirement
age regardless the contribution rate. This is because the higher median
wage, wm = 2674.22, implies a higher legal retirement age resulting in larger
pension benefits. In spite of that, in all cases the reform would be supported
for the majority of the population. Also notice that for τ = 0.35 a coalition
of the low- and high-wage individuals is needed to support a pension scheme
with flexible retirement.
We now turn to the last three rows. The comparison of the results with
Dagum distribution, and ξ(w, 4) = 23500.3 for the second one. And for the more inelastic
labor force: ξ(w, 24) = 4321.07 for the first distribution and ξ(w, 24) = 4303.35 for the
second one.
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the previous ones documents the importance of the elasticity of the labor
force. The negative effect in the financing of the flexible scheme of a more
inelastic labor force causes that all the percentages of individuals preferring a
pension system with legal retirement age grow with respect to those related to
the more elastic labor force. Only for τ = 0.25 in the first distribution wage
the financing of the system is still improved with the flexible scheme. The
lower dispersion of the retirement ages in the flexible scheme also implies that
in the second wage distribution, unlike in the first one, the majority of the
population, mainly the middle class, would be in favour of a legal retirement
age for τ = 0.35.
5. Conclusions
This paper has studied the importance of the retirement rules for the
financing of the pension system and for the welfare levels of individuals by
comparing two polar cases, total flexibility in the retirement decision versus
a system with a legal (mandatory) retirement age.
We have shown that individuals retire earlier in the flexible system than
their preferred legal retirement ages. This result suggests that to eliminate
the standard age at which pension benefits are available and to impose a
flexible system might have a hidden risk. The legal retirement age divides
the population into working people and retired people and it may be a ref-
erence point for most of individuals. It may be easier for them to realize the
indirect macro effects related to this age (apart from the direct effects on
their own working periods). For instance, to perceive the positive effects on
the financing of the pension system from a delay in the legal retirement age.
They may easily note that the improvement is derived from a reduction in
the number of retirees and an increase in the number of workers. However,
if we shift into a flexible system, when individuals decide on their retirement
ages they will not consider that their single decisions affect to the financing
of the pension system (which is plausible, on the other hand). And this mis-
perception may lead them to retire earlier than the existing legal retirement
age.
Thus, for that flexible system to succeed, the legal retirement age should
considerably limit the current retirement ages of a large percentage of the
population, mainly those of high-wage workers. We have shown that this
will crucially depend on the elasticity of the labor force and on the wage
distribution.
We have assumed a uniform pension. But, as mentioned in the introduc-
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tion, pension reforms allowing a greater flexibility in the retirement decision
should be accompanied by an increase in the neutrality of the system. The
reason is the following. In a neutral flexible system, additional contributions
would be fully reflected in pension benefits in an actuarially neutral way
and, consequently, the retirement decision would not be distorted. Neutral-
ity, therefore, would require to substitute uniform pensions by earning-related
ones. Needless to say, the introduction of this additional measure should, of
course, improve the results of the flexible system, but the problem shown
here, the misperception of the indirect macro effects related to retirement
decisions, would still remain. Moreover, as Casamatta et al. (2000a) point
out, the more or less redistributive character of most of Social Security sys-
tems are by now strongly anchored in countries’ traditions. So, although a
shift to a flexible system may be easily implemented, as we have shown with
the welfare analysis, to change the redistribution degree of the system may
be much more difficult to achieve.
Therefore, we might conclude that those countries with a Bismarckian
tradition, like France or Germany, should move towards reforms increasing
the flexibility of the retirement rules and those countries with a Beveridgean
tradition, like Netherlands, United States or UK, should move towards re-
forms delaying the legal retirement age.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
i) Since SF  SL, there exists a wage level ŵ such that R
∗
F (ŵ) = R
e
L.
Given that SF  SL implies that pF  R
e
L, then ν (R
∗
F (ŵ), ŵ)  ν (R
e
L, ŵ) .
Now, we obtain the first derivative of (26) and the first and second of





= ReL (1− τ ) (A1)




= R∗F (w) (1− τ) (A2)













δ > 0 (A3)
The strict convexity of (25) guarantees that ν (R∗F (w), w) > ν (R
e
L, w) ,
and therefore, V (R∗F (w), w) > V (R
e
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